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Abstract 
Large informal (hard to tax) sectors are an integral part of the economies of 
developing countries (Ethiopia included). In much of Africa, the informal, or gray 
economy that escapes tax collectors and government regulators, is the hidden 
dynamic driving economic growth. The informal economy is an important 
contributor to employment and production in Ethiopia but also to fiscal and 
regulatory evasion and, as such, is an intensely debated issue. Informality has a 
direct impact on public revenues and expenditure. If it is large and growing over 
time, policy must attempt to bring it more fully into the tax-base and/or attempt 
to contain its growth. Possible policy-measures will depend on the causes of its 
growth. If it is growing because of restrictions on entry into formal activity, then 
policy must address these restrictions. If, on the other hand, it is growing because 
of too many taxes, then policy must address the structure of taxation. Addressing 
these causes may transform informal into formal activity. Important questions to 
answer in terms of policy are: to what extent the informal sector should be 
taxed, and what instruments can be used to efficiently and effectively 
accomplish the task.  
All over the world several governments (including Ethiopia) have relied in the 
recent past, and still even rely today, on various forms of presumptive taxation, 
to respond to the high levels of informality. Existing presumptive tax regimes 
have seldom been examined thoroughly. This paper looks at the issue of 
presumptive taxation in the Ethiopian context and reflects on how efficient and 
effective the use of presumptive taxation has been. This paper argues that it is 
difficult to evaluate the success of special tax regimes (presumptive taxation in 
this case) to achieve their goals, whether those goals are increased participation 
in the formal tax system, obtaining some basic level of revenue from all economic 
agents, educating new taxpayers, or reducing compliance costs for at-risk 
taxpayers.  
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Introduction 
The informal economy contributes to employment and production in Ethiopia but 
also to fiscal and regulatory evasion and, as such, is an intensely debated issue. 
Informality has a direct impact on public revenues and expenditures – the stuff of 
fiscal policy. If it is large and growing over time, policy must attempt to bring it 
more fully into the tax-base and/or attempt to contain its growth. Possible 
policy-measures will depend on the causes of its growth. If it is growing because 
of restrictions on entry into formal activity, then policy must address these 
restrictions. If, on the other hand, it is growing because of too many taxes, then 
policy must address the structure of taxation. Addressing these causes may 
transform informal into formal activity. As such for countries in terms of policy, 
important questions to answer are: to what extent the informal sector should be 
taxed, and what instruments can be used to efficiently and effectively accomplish 
the task.  
Several governments across the world have relied in the recent past and still rely 
today on various forms of presumptive taxation1, in which indirect methods are 
used for evaluating the1e§ective tax base and computing the corresponding tax 
liability. Basically, the effective tax base is estimated using a set of variables that 
are strongly correlated with it, and are easily observable, but at the same time 
cannot be tampered with by the taxpayers; for example, the type of occupation, 
labour costs, telephone and electricity bills, the number of employees, the size of 
the store, and so on. 
While the government in many developing countries have in recent years 
reformed their tax systems, and while some progress has been made on the old 
problem of the tax-exempt status of the informal sector, there still remains a lot 
to be done. Ethiopia however has made great strides when it comes to taxation 
and the informal sector. What is debatable is whether the informal sector has in 
fact been growing faster than the formal sector in Ethiopia and whether the 
existing tax regime (presumptive taxation) has been successful in accomplishing 
the underlying objectives (broadening the tax base and to increase tax revenue in 
an efficient, equitable and cost effective manner) . 
This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate over the appropriate 
mechanisms for taxing the informal sector in developing countries with a focus on 
the use of presumptive taxation in the Ethiopian context and is structured as 
follows. After this introduction, the next section discusses the debate surrounding 
the definition of the informal Sector “- shadow economy, hard to tax (HTT) sector 
and the links of this sector to the economy of countries. This is followed by a review 
of the growing interest in taxing the informal sector and the various instruments 
(tax regimes) available to governments with a focus on the use presumptive 
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, all taxes are presumptive, since “the conceptually pure tax base cannot be perfectly 
measured, and the tax authority is constrained to rely on some correlate of the concept.” (Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 1457). However, there are cases in which the correlate is immediately found and 
others in which the gap to bridge is relatively large.  
The word “presumptive” in English points at the legal origin of the term and means that there  
are reasonable presumptions about the taxable income of the taxpayer. 
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taxation. The following section contextualizes the issue by discussing the trends 
and cycles of the informal sector in Ethiopia and the use presumptive taxation in 
Ethiopia. This is followed by a broader look at presumptive taxation and the 
effectiveness of such a tax regime. The next section looks ahead and discusses the 
requirements for formalization. The concluding section presents the perceived 
effectiveness of presumptive taxes and issues for further research.  
Definition of Informality and constraints 
The informal sector (economy)2 is a vague term open to a number of 
interpretations. In this paper we have defined informal economy as the ensemble 
of all unobserved economic productive activities that are driven by tax and social 
security evasion or by attempts to avoid compliance with certain legal standards 
and administrative procedures. This definition excludes marginal non taxed 
activities (such as domestic labour and subsistence farming) and therefore criminal 
activities (e.g. smuggling, trafficking, prostitution etc.), which although might exist 
in Ethiopia are different in nature and require different policy measures than 
informal activities. A clear definition of the informal sector is important as differing 
interpretations of the term “informal sector” could lead to significantly different 
estimates and conclusions. However, the issues to address here are straight-
forward: What is formal and what is the informal sector? What are useful 
perspectives on the informal sector from a tax administration perspective? What 
are the implications for taxation? 
To begin with, there are three main schools of thought regarding the relationship 
between the formal and informal economies:  
 The dualists: the informal economy is a separate marginal economy not directly 
linked to the formal economy, providing income or a safety net for the poor (ILO 
1972);  
 The structuralists: the informal economy is subordinated to the formal 
economy. In order to reduce costs, privileged capitalists seek to subordinate 
petty producers and traders (Castells and Portes 1989);  
 The legalists: informal work arrangements are a rational response by micro-
entrepreneurs to over-regulation by government bureaucracies (de Soto, 
1989). 
The informal sector can be usefully broken into two basic types: below and above 
ground informal sectors. Both may be unregistered for any or some types of tax. 
Underground untaxed activities include criminal activities, black market or grey 
activities, and tax evasion. These activities could be conducted by individuals or 
involve organized groups or gangs. Another possibly large underground activity is 
moonlighting, or individuals taking on undocumented jobs or providing services 
(often personal or business services) for fee typically paid in cash. Moonlighting 
may be conducted as an additional job or by a contractor providing added services 
at night or on weekends over and above formal activities. Above ground or parallel 
                                                
2 The informal sector is increasingly being referred to as the informal economy to get away from the 
idea that informality is confined to a specific sector of economic activity but rather cuts across many 
sectors. “Informal economy” also emphasises the existence of  a continuum from the informal to the 
formal ends of  the economy and thus the interdependence between the two sides 
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market activities include micro/small scale unincorporated business activity that 
may also be outside monetary economy. Such activity is often conducted outside of 
any formal law (but possibly within some traditional law) or is only partially 
regulated, and seldom effectively taxed. It includes the majority of economic 
activity of the labour force in many low-income countries. It can include agricultural, 
forestry, fishing, mining, petty manufacturing, trading and personal and business 
services. While some activities may be illegal or constitute tax evasion, the bulk of 
them are routine or traditional subsistence or self-employment business activities.  
Informal sector businesses are typically unincorporated, owner or family managed 
and operated with few, if any regular employees. The business may not keep books 
or records, and may do all exchanges for cash or barter. Only to the extent that the 
business has dealings with a formal sector body – bank, customs service, supplier, 
buyer, cooperative, etc – will a third party have some formal information on these 
activities.  
From the tax administration perspective, the informal sector of the economy is 
composed of individuals and businesses for which the authorities have little or no 
information about their business activities. While a government may (or may not) 
know about the existence of an individual in a jurisdiction, official documentation of 
his or her business activities is often lacking. Given that information on economic 
activities is fundamental to assessing taxes, the informal sector poses a severe 
problem to the tax authorities3.  
From a taxation perspective, the underground or illegal informal activities generally 
reflect an unwillingness to comply rather than a lack of capacity to comply with tax 
laws or regulations. The above ground informal sectors often contain severe 
compliance capacity limitations ranging from a lack of general skills (innumeracy 
and illiteracy) to a lack of more specific tax compliance skills such as the ability to 
issue invoices, maintain transaction records and accounts, or the ability to comply 
with complex tax provisions 
Taking the above into consideration, almost all of the literature highlights the 
importance of the following key factors in the establishment and growth of the 
informal economy:   
 High intensity of legal and administrative regulations: the greater the 
intensity of  regulations such as business registration, license and permit 
requirements, labour market restrictions, trade barriers, etc, the greater 
the incentive for flight into the informal economy. Research also suggests 
that law enforcement, not just the intensity of regulations, may be a key 
issue.  
 High overall tax and social security burdens: basically, the higher the 
difference between the total cost of labour in the official economy and 
after tax earnings from work, the greater the incentive for flight 
                                                
3 Typically, the more different parties have information about and an interest in these 
business activities; such transparency and accountability makes the accurate assessment of 
taxes easier or tax evasion more difficult. 
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operation in the informal economy.  
 Lack of trust in official institutions / administrative corruption: examples 
of such corruption include the court system, unclear legislation and 
bureaucracy.   
 Lack of access to formal property systems: this refers to the lack of clear 
property rights and title deeds and the inability to collateralise property 
assets. This obstructs firms’ access to official financial institutions such 
as credit lines, insurance, etc.  
 Long-term decline in civic virtue and loyalty towards public institutions, 
combined with a decline in tax morale.  
 Broad acceptance of illicit work often sanctioned or tolerated by the state.  
(Ernste, 2003, p.91; Djankov et al, 2002; De Soto, 2000) 
In a comprehensive literature review, Ernste (2003) argues that since taxes affect 
labour-leisure choices and stimulate labour supply in the informal economy, the 
distorting effect of this choice is a major concern, leading to the conclusion that 
the bigger the difference between the total costs of labour in the official economy 
and the after-tax earnings from work, the greater the incentive to avoid the 
difference and work in the informal economy. 
Why does informality matter? 
Informality matters for several reasons. A good reason is that it stifles 
investment and undermines the overall competitiveness of the economy, because 
many informal enterprises are stuck in a low-productivity trap (Palmade, 2005). 
Being outside the regulatory and tax umbrella means that these enterprises can 
afford to be less productive than their competitors in the formal sector. But it 
also means that they are locked out of markets for finance, technology, and other 
resources that would enable them to close the gap.  
 
Schneider, (2003) considers the development of the shadow economy in thirty –
seven African countries4 from 1990-2000. From this study we realize that the 
informal (shadow) economies in these countries have increased. On average, the 
size of these thirty-seven African shadow economies was 41.3% of the official 
GDP in 1990/2000, and increased to 43.2% in 2002/2003. This is an average 
increase of 0.9 percentage points over a four year period. From the results in 
2002/2003, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria (with 63.2, 60.2, and 59% 
respectively) had by far the largest shadow economies. At the other end of the 
scale, South Africa had the lowest shadow economy, with 29.5%, followed by 
Lesotho with 33.3% and Namibia with 33.4% 
                                                
4 For a more detailed explanation  see Schneider, 2003 Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over 
the World : Estimation Results over the period of 1999-2003,  p15 
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Table 1: Shadow Economy (in % of Official GDP) 
  Shadow Economy (in %of Official GDP) Using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No Country 1990/2000 2001-2002 2002- 2003 
1 Algeria 34,1 35,0 35,6 
2 Angola 43,2 44,1 45,2 
3 Benin 47,3 48,2 49,1 
4 Burkina Faso 41,4 42,6 43,3 
5 Cameroon 32,8 33,7 34,9 
6 Congo, Dem. Rep. 48,0 48,8 49,7 
7 Egypt, Arab Rep 35,1 36,0 36,9 
8 Ethiopia 40,3 41,4 42,1 
9 Ghana 41,9 42,7 43,6 
10 Kenya 34,3 35,1 36,0 
11 Lesotho 31,3 32,4 33,3 
12 Mali 42,3 43,9 44,7 
13 Morocco 36,4 37,1 37,9 
14 Mozambique 40,3 41,3 42,4 
15 Nigeria 57,9 58,6 59,4 
16 South Africa 28,4 29,1 29,5 
17 Zimbabwe 59,4 60,0 63,2 
Source: Adapted from Schneider, 2003 Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: 
Estimation Results over the period of 1999-2003, p15 
** Some of the figures presented above are questionable. For Zimbabwe for obvious reasons (the 
collapses of the formal economy); for Mali, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic republic of Congo there 
is room to believe that the figures could be higher. 
There is no doubt that the informal economy forms a large part of the economies 
of many developing and transition countries. It comprises 42% of value added in 
Africa, 41% in Latin America and 35% in the transition economies of Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, compared with 13.5% in OECD countries. The informal 
economy provides employment and income for many who lose or cannot find 
work in the formal economy, and it includes a disproportionate number of 
women, young people and others from disadvantaged groups. For example, it has 
been estimated that informal employment accounts for 84% of women’s 
employment in sub-Saharan Africa, (OECD, 2006). 
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The large informal (shadow) economy in Africa (Ethiopia included) is less an issue 
of tax burdens than a simple fact that the limited economy means that citizens 
are often unable to earn a living wage in a legitimate manner. Working in the 
shadow economy is often the only way of achieving a minimal standard of living 
(Schneider, 2005). 
Interest in taxing the informal Sector 
Given the current size of the informal economy and its propensity to keep 
increasing, there has been a growing interest in taxing the informal sector5 in most 
developing countries for a number of reasons (Ayee, 2007). They include the 
following: 
 Revenue needs: The introduction of neo-liberal reforms under structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP) with emphasis on liberalization, downsizing 
and changing tax policy as well  as tax administration has brought to the 
fore the urgent practical necessity of increasing revenues, which will enable 
the state to deliver basic services. In fact, revenue maximization is the 
primary objective of tax policy. The informal sector therefore becomes the 
obvious avenue to be drawn into the tax net having been mostly out of it; 
 The phenomenal size and growth of informal sector: The liberalization 
of economies as a result of SAP has pushed many formal businesses into 
the informal sector in most developing countries.  Recent calculations 
estimate that the size of the informal sector in developing countries varies 
between about twenty percent in Indonesia to around sixty seven percent 
of GDP in Bolivia (Schneider, 2002). The informal sector is complex and 
heterogeneous comprising of large enterprises and small; urban firms and 
rural ones; visible activities as well as invisible ones; owners as well as 
workers; local activities as well as those that cross jurisdictional boundaries;  
 Impact on tax compliance in the formal sector: Legitimate taxpayers in 
the formal sector perceive the state as being unfair in pursuing them for 
taxes while the informal sector continues to operate untaxed.  Ignoring 
informal sector activities will lower compliance morale and increase the risk 
of generalized non compliance (Terkper, 2003).  There is some evidence 
from Latin America suggesting that tax compliance in the formal sector is 
higher in countries which have a relatively small informal sector (Torgler, 
2003).   
 State legitimacy: Informalization might be indicative of the fact that 
operators see no value in engaging with the state in the protection of life 
and property, and therefore legitimacy becomes a serious concern.  In order 
to regain legitimacy, governments are looking for ways to incorporate 
informal activities into formal systems.  Taxation is a good route into the 
problem, as it enables governments to recognize informal activities without 
                                                
5 Despite the extensive debate about the definition of the term ‘informal sector’ we continue to use it 
for the purposes of this paper bearing in mind that the informal sector is heterogenous, includes a broad 
continuum from the ‘less formal’ activities that have only some of the characteristics of informality to 
the ‘totally informal’ ones that exhibit all the characteristics of informality.  For a recent discussion of 
the definition of the informal sector see Gerxhani (2003). 
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legitimizing the breaking of other rules and regulations.  Broadening the 
tax base and developing a ‘culture of compliance’ can achieve more than 
simply increasing revenues; it can be a way of re-engaging citizens with the 
state.  
 Demands from the informal sector: Research shows that those within 
the informal sector are willing to pay taxes, specifically when these are in 
exchange for some legitimacy, stability and protection from arbitrary 
harassment from state agents (Dickovick, 2003, Baross, 1990).  For many 
within the sector, the tax burden is not onerous, especially as they are 
paying informally anyway, albeit as bribes to street level bureaucrats, in 
order to continue operating; 
 Tax-Accountability link: Governments that are dependent upon earned 
revenues such as taxes (as opposed to unearned revenues such as aid or 
mineral wealth) are more likely to be responsive to their citizens for various 
reasons.  The flip side of the argument suggests that citizens who pay 
taxes will demand more responsive governments (Gloppen, 2002).  By 
encouraging people within the informal sector to come within the tax net, it 
is thus assumed that they will start the process of a constructive 
engagement with the state—of gaining services and rights and becoming 
full citizens. In short, widening the tax net will spark off a virtuous cycle of 
taxation and accountability that is at the heart of consolidating 
democracies (Joshi and Ayee, 2006). 
While there is this growing interest in taxing the informal sector, many scholars 
also assert that high taxation rates induce tax evasion and informality (Thomas, 
1992; Schneider, 1994, 1997; Kaufmann, 1996; Johnson, 1999; Tanzi 1999, among 
others).  High taxes reduce profit margins and thus the incentive to engage in 
business in the formal sector or possibly at all (see Gwartney, 1996).  The 
relationship between the rate of taxation and the size of the informal sector is 
complex, however.  Johnson et al. (1999) found that the US has relatively high tax 
rates, but a small informal sector, and that in some cases decreasing tax rates 
can lead to an increase in size of the informal sector. 
Moreover, different types of taxes and different taxation rates have varying 
impacts on a firm’s tax burden and on the size of the informal sector. The 
literature suggests that institutional aspects such as tax administration may 
affect the size of the informal sector at least as much as the tax rates.   
Our concern in this paper, however, is with the more limited question of the 
extent to which “presumptive taxation” can be an effective tool to cope with 
what are commonly called the “hard-to-tax”.  While the HTT category is seldom 
very clearly defined – often, for example, it excludes those at the top of the power 
pyramid who manage to save themselves from the full fury of the taxman in 
accepted (or at least untouchable) ways – it appears to encompass much of the 
so-called “informal” (“hidden” “shadow” “underground”) economy that is such a 
prominent feature of economic reality in many developing and transition 
countries (Schneider, 2003).   Although much of the discussion in this paper 
covers the use (and abuse) of presumptive taxes in general, our specific focus is 
on the special simplified tax regimes that have been put into place recently in a 
number of transitional countries.    
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The use of presumptive taxation 
It is the nature of the business of tax administration that the “customers” are not 
very willing. In all countries, some enterprises and individuals manage to avoid 
the full impact of the tax system.  They do so in many ways.  Some have 
sufficient political influence to remain outside of the scope of the legislation in 
the first place. Others, also usually at the upper end of the economic spectrum, 
manage to devise legal ways around the apparent intent of the law.  Still others 
simply cheat, for example, by claiming improper deductions or under-reporting 
income or sales.  At the extreme, some evaders may operate completely outside 
the scope of the formal tax system.  And finally, some may simply refuse to pay 
their taxes.   Each of these types of evasion may be dealt with in different ways.   
While Benjamin Franklin may have been right that death and taxes are the only 
certain things in life6, this certainty definitely does not extend to the way taxes 
are levied: tax systems are continuously changing as countries align their tax 
systems with evolving economic, political, and administrative conditions7. 
Presumptive taxation involves the use of indirect means to ascertain tax liability8, 
which differ from the usual rules based on the taxpayer's accounts.  The term 
"presumptive" is used to indicate that there is a legal presumption that the 
taxpayer's income is no less than the amount resulting from application of the 
indirect method. Broadly speaking, a presumptive income tax (P-tax for short) is a 
tax based on some measure of economic activity that proxy for taxable income, 
rather than on taxable income itself. The concept covers a wide variety of 
alternative means of determining the tax base, ranging from methods of 
reconstructing income based on administrative practice, which can be rebutted by 
the taxpayer, to true minimum taxes with tax bases specified in legislation9.   
Presumptive techniques may be employed for a variety of reasons.   
i. One is simplification, particularly in relation to the compliance burden on 
taxpayers with very low turnover (and the corresponding administrative 
burden of auditing such taxpayers).  
                                                
6 “In this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Benjamin Franklin, 1789, in 
a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy. 
7 In fact, a whole “industry” has emerged that on a daily basis scrutinizes and reports on 
global tax reform initiatives. 
8 A useful description is provided by Ahmad & Stern: "The term presumptive taxation covers 
a number of procedures under which the `desired' base for taxation (direct or indirect) is not 
itself measured but is inferred from some simple indicators which are more easily measured 
than the base itself." Ehtisham Ahmad & Nicholas Stern, The Theory and Practice of Tax 
Reform in Developing Countries 276 (1991). 
9 For further discussion and analysis of presumptive taxation, see Indira Rajamaran, 
Presumptive Direct Taxation: Lessons from Experience in Developing Countries, Economic 
and Political Weekly (forthcoming); Arye Lapidoth, The Use of Estimation for the 
Assessment of Taxable Business Income (1977); Kenan Bulutoglu, Presumptive Taxation, in 
Tax Policy Handbook 258 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995); Russell Krelove and Janet 
Stotsky, Asset and Wealth Taxes, in id. 181; Vito Tanzi & Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, 
Presumptive Income Taxation: Administrative, Efficiency, and Equity Aspects (IMF 
Working Paper, 1987)  
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ii. A second is to combat tax avoidance or evasion (which works only if the 
indicators on which the presumption is based are more difficult to hide 
than those forming the basis for accounting records).  
iii. Third, by providing objective indicators for tax assessment, presumptive 
methods may lead to a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, 
when normal accounts-based methods are unreliable because of problems 
of taxpayer compliance or administrative corruption.  
iv. Fourth, rebuttable10 presumptions can encourage taxpayers to keep proper 
accounts, because they subject taxpayers to a possibly higher tax burden 
in the absence of such accounts.  
v. Fifth, presumptions of the exclusive type (see below) can be considered 
desirable because of their incentive effects—a taxpayer who earns more 
income will not have to pay more tax.  
vi. Finally, presumptions that serve as minimum taxes may be justified by a 
combination of reasons (revenue need, fairness concerns, and political or 
technical difficulty in addressing certain problems directly as opposed to 
doing so through a minimum tax). 
Turning finally, to “presumptive” regimes as such, a useful starting point is to think 
of four possible approaches to administrative assessment (Bulutoglu, 1995):  
Systems that estimate taxpayer income on some specific basis.  The estimate may 
be applied on an individual basis to different taxpayers (the French forfait, for 
instance) or differently for different groups of taxpayers (the Israeli takshiv, for 
example11).   The amount assessed may be a simple lump-sum tax based on the 
average income of a particular trade or profession, or it may be based on a more 
complex calculation using information on sales, employees, assets, location, etc.    
1. Systems which apply an assets tax (either generally for all businesses or as 
a minimum tax);  
2. Systems which apply a gross receipts or  turnover tax (either generally for 
all  businesses or as a minimum tax);  
3. Systems which base the tax on external indicators of income such as items 
of   personal expenditures (e.g. on automobiles) or wealth (e.g. housing)12.   
  
The system used in a country should presumably be related to its policy objective – 
for example, to reduce evasion in general or to simplify the system for small 
taxpayers – as well as to the sophistication of its tax administration and the data 
available13.  The table below summarizes some examples of the various forms of 
presumptive taxes found in a few countries.    
                                                
10 Rebuttable presumptions: The rebuttability as regards presumptive taxation involves for 
the taxpayer the opportunity to justify that his tax liability accrued on the basis of general 
taxation rules is smaller than the one calculated under the conditions of special treatment.  In 
other words, the taxpayer can arrange the reduction of his / her tax liabilities with the tax 
authorities in the framework of an administrative procedure. 
11 For more detailed discussion, see Thuronyi (1996, 2003). 
12 The first three approaches mentioned are also widely used for local business taxation, on which see 
Bird (2003). 
13 For a good discussion of the last two points, see Musgrave (1981). 
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Table 2: Presumptive Taxation in Different Countries 
Country Tax Treatment Condition 
Belgium   Small businesses:  Flat rate for three 
years   
“Forfait” scheme applying 
to small businesses based 
on profession for income 
below BF 100,00 
Greece   
  
Small businesses:  Flat rate applied to 
purchases and receipts   
1992 
Spain     
      
Small businesses:  Forfait scheme for 
twenty-eight industries 
Began in 1992 
Bolivia    Other small businesses covered by a 
standard flat rate tax 
Tax base:  sales minus 
limited expenses 
Israel Small businesses in two sectors:  
Transport (no threshold) 
Retail and artisans (threshold of $4,000 
tunover) 
Tax Base:  Turnover 
Mexico Small businesses and professionals (no 
threshold):    
Tax Base:  Total income 
Uruguay   Small businesses and professional:  all 
industries at a standard percentage      
Tax Base:  a mix of total 
turnover and inputs 
Angola Small businesses:  all industries with 
turnover less than $22,000; taxed as a 
flat amount (un-indexed) Small 
businesses:  all industries with turnovers 
less than $20,000 
Tax Base:  cash flow 
Cameroon Small business Sector Tax base Turnover 
Morocco Small business service sector Tax base; Turnover 
Tax Base:  Flat 
presumptive amount 
Tax Base:  Turnover, taxed 
as a fixed percentage 
Ghana Small businesses: all self-employed   Presumptive tax applied 
based on occupation or 
business  
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Russia Small businesses: selected industries, 
indexed threshold for gross receipts and 
based on number of employees 
Tax Base:  Gross receipts 
or profits.  If taxed on 
gross receipts received 6 
percent, if taxed on 
profits, the rate is 15 
percent. 
If eligible for the imputed 
tax, the base is calculated 
and the determined by 
the regional 
governments. 
Ukraine   Small businesses: eligibility based on 
number of employees and level of 
turnover 
Tax Base for unified tax:  
Turnover.  If tax is to 
include VAT6 percent, if it 
excludes VAT, the rate is 
10 percent 
Fixed tax, trade permit, 
and small enterprise tax 
are also available 
Uganda Small business:  all industries with annual 
turnover approximately $38,000 US 
Tax Base:  Turnover, taxed 
as a fixed percentage 
   
Source: Complied from: Bird and Wallace (2003)  Coopers and Lybrand (1997), Rajaraman (1995), 
Bulutoglu (1995), Eglu and Heloo (2001), Chen and Reinkka (1999), Stotsky (1995), Shome (1995), 
Wallace (2002),  Engelschalk (2003) 
It should be noted that using presumptions improves the admissibility of a 
tax while lowering its accuracy. The key question that arises: to what extent 
the former benefit justifies the latter cost. On a related issue, some in the 
field believe that presumptive taxation should be considered a permanent 
supplement or even a replacement for the more traditional tax system. 
Others see it as a merely transitional phase until the tax administration is 
capable of collecting the normal tax without the widespread use of 
presumptions. No matter what system of presumptive taxation is used, there are 
definitely always advantages and disadvantages.  
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Table 3. Possible advantages and disadvantages of presumptive tax systems 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Lower compliance costs No incentive to improve bookkeeping 
Tax liability more predictable No relief in case of loss making 
Less interaction with tax administration Potential disincentive to grow  
Generally lower tax burden Risk of abuse 
 Fairness concerns 
Source: 
Presumptive taxation raises both theoretical and practical issues of great 
importance. From a policy perspective, the extent to which presumptions 
can operate to simplify the task of administration without fundamentally 
changing the tax base is a key issue. From a practical perspective, the 
fundamental issue in presumptive taxation is the trade-off between 
accuracy and administrability.  
The informal sector in Africa and Ethiopia  
Since many African countries either don’t collect data on the informal sector or 
they use different definitions, it is difficult to make strict comparisons within and 
between countries. Nonetheless, the available data clearly indicates that the 
informal sector represents both a significant component of gross domestic 
product and employment in most African countries.  (Verick, 2006) 
The World Bank as part of its work on benchmarking business regulations has 
developed a measure of the size of the informal economy. The methodology for 
estimating this indicator is based on the study by Schneider (2002). Using this 
data, Figure 1 graphs the size of the informal economy as a percentage of gross 
national income (GNI), which ranges from under 30 percent in South Africa, the 
continent’s largest economy, to almost 60 percent in Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe. The average in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 42.3 percent.   
Turning to the labour market, based on figures reported in ILO (2002a) the 
informal sector in SSA is estimated to represent around three-quarters of non-
agricultural employment. According to ILO (2002c), the sector amounts to 72 
percent of employment in sub-Saharan Africa, 78 percent if South Africa is 
excluded. Statistics reported in Chen (2001) suggest that 93 percent of new jobs 
created in Africa during the 1990s were in the informal sector, reflecting the 
impact of globalization, economic reforms and competitive pressures on the 
labour market in recent years.   
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Xaba et al. (2002) summarise the experience of a number of African countries, 
which shows that there has been a decline or stagnation in employment growth 
in the formal sector, while the informal sector on the continent has been growing 
in terms of both its share of output and employment. For example, informal 
employment in Kenya and Uganda exceeds employment in the formal sector. In 
terms of Southern Africa, in Zambia 43 percent of urban employment is in the 
informal economy, while in Mozambique evidence suggests that 30-40 percent of 
urban households were dependent on the informal economy in the 1990s. As also 
reported in Xaba et al. (ibid), 89 percent of the labour force in Ghana is employed 
in the informal sector.  
 In Ethiopia, classifying economic activities into formal and informal and 
measuring the extent to which the informal economy generates employment 
opportunities are challenging tasks. In the first national labour force survey (1999) 
in the country, the following definition of informal employment was used. “A 
person is considered to work in the informal economy when he/she is engaged in 
a business or enterprise that does not keep book of account, has less than 10 
workers, has no business/enterprise license and works at least four hours a 
week.”  Excluding people engaged in subsistence farming and those working in 
private households, a quarter of all employed individuals were employed in the 
formal sector while nearly three-quarters of the population were employed in the 
informal economy in 1999. With 87 per cent and 52 per cent of the total rural and 
urban population involved in informal economy activities respectively, the 
proportion of informal economy employment is clearly higher in rural areas. This 
is not surprising given the fact that formal employment opportunities, education 
and other services that enhance the employability of people are much higher in 
urban areas.  (Berhanu Denu, Abraham Tekeste and van der Deijl 2005. p.24) 
Fransen and van Dijk, 2008, stipulate that as much as 69% of all employment in 
Addis Ababa and 65% of urban Ethiopia is informal. This comprises those working 
in informal business, which is the rather narrow definition applied by the 
Ethiopian Government, as well as a huge group of domestic workers, apprentices 
and unpaid family workers. Those could be added to the statistics offered by the 
Central Statistics Agency without errors of inclusion, as they are not working for 
informal businesses14 
Informal businesses in Ethiopia are defined using three criteria: no book of 
accounts; no license; and fewer than 10 employees (World Bank 2007c). 
Registration is a first but not yet sufficient step towards licensing. Based on 
official statistics, 26% of those employed in Addis Ababa work in informal 
businesses, with another 4.8% reported as unpaid family work, other employees 
or so called domestic workers engaged in sales, machine operating, trade, clerks 
and official work. The sectors wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 
                                                
14 The question of measurement comes up again because Fransen and van Dijk also point out 
that the percentages they arrived at  differ from those mentioned by the World Bank (2007c) 
and CSA (2005), who in their opinion erred by not excluding the ‘not identified’ and ‘not 
stated’ in their calculations. World Bank (2007c) also makes error of inclusion by adding self 
employed which can already be part of informal businesses. 
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and primary production activities are over 90% informal, measured as a share of 
employment.  
Table 4: Regional distribution of informal employment in urban areas (%), 1999-
2004  
 1999 2003 2004 
Region M F T M F T M F T 
Tigray 4.0 7.4 6.0 4.2 7.7 5.9 5.9 7.6 6.8 
Afar 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
Amhara 17.2 23.6 20.
9 
17.6 23.6 20.7 15.0 23.
4 
19.3 
Oromiya 38.
4 
38.
9 
38.7 28.
4 
31.9 30.
2 
31.1 31.7 31.4 
Somali 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.1 2.1 3.1 2.6 
Benishangul-Gumuz 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 
SNNP 12.4 12.7 12.6 13.1 13.3 13.2 12.8 14.2 13.5 
Gambella 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 NA NA NA 
Harari 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Addis Ababa 20.
8 
10.7 15.0 29.7 14.8 22.1 28.
3 
15.3 21.7 
Dire Dawa 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.2 2.3 
Country Total 
(*Urban) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
          
Source: CSA (1999) and (2004); NA – Not available 
The Use of Presumptive Taxation in Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, appropriate fiscal policy measures have been introduced to encourage 
taxpayers through facilitating the tax collection system and its revenue 
generation. Measures taken so far include: income tax streamlining and closing of 
loopholes, improving the incentive system, strengthening tax administration, 
overhauling the income tax law and regulations, introducing a broad-based Value 
Added Tax (VAT) and tax identification numbers, and rationalizing tariff rates. 
(See Box Below) 
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Box1: Implementation of the Tax Reform Programme has helped to revamp 
Tax Revenue collection  
 
In order to achieve development objectives through the PASDEP, mobilizing 
financial resources is indispensable. The major sustainable source of the required 
financial resource is domestic revenues from tax and non-tax sources.  In line with 
this, in the past years, the Government adopted far-reaching tax reform 
measures including overhauling the tax laws and regulations, broaden the  tax 
base by way of introducing the Value Added and Turn over taxes back in 2003. 
Parallel with the tax reform programs extensive tax administration measures 
have been undertaken. The tax administration measures include the 
implementation of a national Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), the 
introduction of the presumptive tax scheme in order to address the hard to tax 
group, re-organizing tax collection institutions, computerizing the tax 
administration, and conducting comprehensive tax education to enhance 
taxpayers’ compliance.   
  
Since identification and registration of the tax payer is the prime function of the 
tax collecting institution, the introduction of TIN is expected to improve the over 
all revenue performance through creating data base, improving information flow, 
and creating essential link to all tax operations. Of all the tax reform efforts 
undertaken so far, substituting the previous cascading sales tax with a well 
designed and modern value-added tax system could be cited as significant step in 
the reform program and a major success. Comparative studies attested that VAT 
revenue productivity compared with our neighboring countries has been found to 
be very encouraging. Accordingly, the VAT significantly contributed to revamp 
recent tax revenue performance.   
  
Tax assessment in the absence of books of account is the most challenging 
aspects of tax administration.  
 
To this end, the government introduced presumptive tax assessment scheme on 
category "C" tax payers15 aimed at improving equity and putting administrative 
simplicity. The scheme has been implemented at regional level to collect profit 
tax from potential taxpayers with lesser collection cost and minimized collusion. 
The introduction of turn over tax on those who are not eligible to VAT is intended 
to keep the neutrality of the tax system and argument revenue collection by 
                                                
15 Scope of schedule “C” income: Income tax shall be imposed on the taxable business 
income realized from entrepreneurial activity. Taxable business income: taxable business 
income shall be determined per tax period on the basis of the profit and loss account or 
income statement, which shall be drawn in compliance with the General Accepted 
Accounting standards, subject to the provisions of this proclamation (Proclamation No. 
286/2002; Income Tax Proclamation) and the derivatives issued by the Tax Authority. 
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regional Governments. In the process of improving the tax system and promote 
service delivery, various operational programmes, systems and procedures have 
been introduced in taxpayers’ revenue accounting. Such measures enhanced 
efficiency and effectiveness in the management of tax arrears and taxpayers' 
compliance. Above all, the tax reform agenda incorporated a comprehensive 
computerization programme aimed at automating all tax administration function 
through out the nation. To this effect, since the beginning of 2005, a tax system 
that handles all taxes in a single software system known as Standard Integrated 
Government Tax Administration System (SIGTAS) is being installed. Currently 
SIGTAS is implemented in Large Taxpayers’ Office (LTO) and Addis Ababa Branch 
offices as well as regional offices of FIRA where the system is intended to 
administer VAT.  
  
Source: MOFED 
In Ethiopia, according to Article 68(1) and (2) of Income Tax Proclamation-No 
286/2002, Standard Assessment method is used to determine the Income Tax 
liability of Category C taxpayers. The Standard Assessment is the fixed amount of 
tax determined in accordance with Council of Ministers Regulations.  
The Scope of Schedule “C” Income 
Income tax shall be imposed on the taxable business income realized from 
entrepreneurial activity. The taxable income shall be determined per tax period on 
the basis of the profit or loss account or an income statement, which shall be drawn 
in compliance with the General Accepted accounting Standards, subject to the 
provisions of this proclamation (Proclamation No. 286/2002) and directives issued 
by the tax Authorities.  
The tax rate shall be determined as follows: 
1) taxable income of bodies is taxable at the rate of 30% 
2) taxable business income of other taxpayers shall be taxed in 
accordance with the following schedule (See Table 5) 
In this regard, The Council of Ministers Regulations No.78/2002, Article 21 states 
that category “C” taxpayers (whose annual turnover estimated by the tax Authority 
as being up to Birr 100,000) shall pay tax in accordance with Schedule “1” and “2” 
attached with these Regulations. For this purpose the estimated Average Annual 
Profitability Rate varies in the range of 10% to 70% depending upon the nature of 
business service sectors. The basic amount of 100,000 is divided in to 19 divisions 
starting with the division of “up to Birr 10,000 and thereafter an increment of 
5,000 Birr each for subsequent divisions. 
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Table 5: Marginal tax rate for presumptive tax on business Annual taxable income 
(birr) Marginal tax rate % Schedule “C” 
Taxable Business Income (per Year) 
Threshold Presumptive Tax 
 
Income Tax Payable 
0 1800 Exempt Threshold 
1,801 7,800 10 
7,801  16,800 15 
16,801 28,200 20 
28,201 42,600 25 
42,601 60,000 30 
Over 60,000   35 
Source: Proclamation No. 286/2002) 
In countries (Ethiopia included) operating a presumptive tax system for small 
businesses, the threshold for the application of such system serves as one proxy 
for the definition of a small business for tax purposes. This threshold varies 
considerably from country to country (See table below) 
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Table 6: Comparative analysis of Threshold for Presumptive Turnover Taxes in 
Different Countries 
Country Threshold Presumptive Tax 
 
Armenia   Turnover below AMD 30 million (US$89,000) 
Brazil Gross income not more than R$240,000 (US$103,000) for 
individuals and  R$2,400,000 (US$1.03 million) for 
incorporated SMEs 
Bulgaria Turnover below BGL 75,000 (US$52,000) 
Ethiopia Turnover below Birr 100,000 (US$11,000) 
Hungary Turnover below HUF 25 million (US$120,000) 
Laos Turnover below KN 100 million (US$11,000) 
Peru Gross income below PEN 240,000 (US$71,000) 
Tanzania Turnover below TSH 20 million (US$16,000) 
Russian Federation Up to 1000 employees plus turnover below RUB 11 million 
(US$426,000 
Zambia Turnover below ZMK 200 million (US$50,000) 
Source: International Finance Corporation. (2007) Designing a Tax System for Micro 
and Small Businesses. Guide for Practitioners.  
 A broader look at presumptive taxation 
Existing presumptive tax regimes have seldom been examined thoroughly. Most 
do not seem to have been very successful from any perspective. The firms subject 
to presumptive tax regimes may prefer such regimes because it shelters them 
from some of the complexity of the tax system and the rapacity of some tax 
officials (Engelschalk, 2004). The tax administration may also prefer presumptive 
regimes because they no longer have to deal with troublesome small taxpayers 
and can concentrate on those large taxpayers that pay a very large percentage of 
total tax revenue. 
Politicians may also prefer presumptive tax regimes because the small taxpayer 
community is large and vociferous and they think it either costs them little in 
terms of revenues or may even generate revenue. 
However, those concerned with the equity, efficiency, and long-term development 
of sound tax systems should be less sanguine about presumptive tax regimes. 
Presumptive tax regimes intended in part to reduce the compliance and 
administrative costs of taxation may increase rather than decrease efficiency 
costs (Bird, 2003).  
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These regimes are generally not well designed and are almost never well 
integrated with the regular tax system. Too high an exit threshold from the 
presumptive system undermines the regular tax system and invites too many 
participants into the special regime. Too low an entry threshold may discourage 
small business activity and may impose tax liability on persons who should not be 
in the tax system. Presumptive tax regimes that define eligibility narrowly may 
also undermine the fairness of the overall tax system. (Bird, 2005). 
Another concern is the implication of presumptive tax regimes for tax compliance. 
A traditional tax system relies on both enforced compliance and voluntary 
compliance. The educational goal of presumptive tax regimes is to bring hard-to-
tax sectors into the tax net and to encourage participation in the regular tax 
system, thus increasing voluntary compliance. But a presumptive tax regime that 
does not ‘graduate’ its taxpayers may undermine the tax system as a whole. 
Instead of expanding the regular tax system, such a system may create a new 
generation of taxpayers who rely on presumptive tax regimes for their existence. 
Moreover, some so-called simplified systems are actually complicated. Although 
in theory more complication may or may not reduce compliance, in practice, 
experience tends to support the latter outcome (e.g. World Bank, 2003). 
How Effective has the Presumptive Tax Regime been?  
In general, presumptive income taxation has several advantages.  
1. First, this type of taxation reduces tax evasion by individual 
entrepreneurs. Their income is no longer assessed from accounting 
records but from indirect indicators such as type of business activity, 
number of employees, etc. This approach to estimating income on which 
the tax is levied removes the administrative burden of financial 
transparency traditionally required for compliance.  
2. Second, it leads to a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. It is 
generally accepted that wages paid by legal entities are taxed more 
effectively than income earned by individual entrepreneurs due to the 
introduction of withholding taxes at source. The presumption reduces tax 
evasion and hence brings more taxpayers into the tax net. As a result, the 
perceived fairness of the tax system increases. 
3. Third, presumptive income taxation leads to simplification of taxation by 
reducing the compliance burden for individual entrepreneurs and the 
corresponding cost of enforcement by tax authorities.  
4. Fourth, presumptive income taxes are a stable source of the government 
tax revenue due to the fact that the amount of taxes doesn’t depend on 
actual outcomes of individual entrepreneurs’ performance.   
It is however difficult to evaluate the success of special tax regimes such as 
presumptive taxation in achieving their goals, whether those goals are increased 
participation in the formal tax system, obtaining some basic level of revenue from 
all economic agents, educating new taxpayers, or reducing compliance costs for 
at-risk taxpayers.  Simply tracking revenues before and after the imposition of a 
special tax regime seldom serves to answer the question because many of these 
regimes yield little revenue and it is difficult to control adequately for other 
changes to the tax system.    
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In principle, a special tax regime for the HTT might be considered a success if it 
produced the following scenario (Bird, 2003).  
A small, start-up firm is outside of the tax net.  A special tax regime is instituted 
with the stated objective of encouraging such firms to become part of the formal 
sector and educating them to the point where they are able to do so. The firm stays 
on the simplified system for a limited period and then graduates to the regular tax 
system.    
 On the other hand, such a special regime would clearly be a failure if it encouraged 
entities that had previously participated in the regular tax system to move to the 
special regime.  It would also be a failure from an educational perspective if firms 
stayed on the regime for year after year after year. Finally, since another aim of 
most special regimes is simply to increase revenues, they would also no doubt be 
considered failures if the long-run effect on revenues, compared to what would 
have happened in the absence of the regime, is negative.  It seems that no existing 
presumptive regimes have been thoroughly examined from any of these 
perspectives.  One reason may be is that most of them would likely fail all of these 
tests. 
Based on the above the Ethiopian system of presumptive income taxation of 
individual entrepreneurs based on the standard assessment method16 can be 
deemed successful in terms have captured a large number of  small start-up firms 
which were previously outside the formal bracket. (See Addis case study below). 
The system also has additional advantages.  
First of all, standard assessments have shown to broaden the tax base with limited 
disincentives to earn income. In the short-run, they can entice individual 
entrepreneurs into the tax net by providing incentives rewarding efficiency. 
Taxation based on average income allows taxpayers to retain some profit with-out 
being taxed. Furthermore, standard assessments are the most adequate method of 
taxation of small businesses like individual entrepreneurs without a legal entity. 
This method implies low administrative costs and less open to corruption. The 
estimated assessment method would make the presumption just harder to keep 
transparent and simple and would give a lot of room to political bargaining which 
would definitely not make it more equitable.  
                                                
16 The Standard Assessment Method: Standard assessments assign lump-sum taxes to taxpayers on the 
basis of occupation or business activity. Standard assessments have shown to broaden the tax base with 
limited disincentives. Although this method is viewed as less equitable than estimated assessments it is 
also less open to corruption (although estimated assessments are employed as an alternative to standard 
assessments when taxpayers do not file or are audited). 
It is important to understand that standard assessments can be a poor revenue-mobilizing method of 
taxation unless the fixed payments are indexed to inflation (or increased regularly) and taxpayers are 
moved to categories as their taxable incomes increase over time. Furthermore, standard assessments do 
not take into account taxpayer-specific conditions, such as family size or losses in a particular year. As 
a result, it can be regressive by imposing equal tax on individuals in the same category with different 
incomes. (World Bank) 
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Secondly, the facility provided in the proclamation to be able to carry losses forward 
takes into account taxpayer-specific conditions, such as losses in a particular year. 
Hence negating the negative impact this could have on risky investments. 
Proclamation No 286/2002 clear stipulates that:  
If the determination of taxable business income results in a tax period, that loss 
may be set off against taxable income in the next five (5) tax periods,\earlier losses 
being set off before later losses. 
If during a tax period the direct or indirect ownership of the share of the capital or 
the voting rights of a body changes more than twenty-five percent (25%), by value 
or by number, sub-Article (1) shall cease to apply to losses incurred by that body in 
that tax period and the previous tax periods. 
It is also stated that a net operating loss may be carried forward and deducted only 
for two (2) periods of three years (Article 28 – Sub-article 3; Proclamation 
No.286/2002) 
However, the existing system of presumptive income taxation also had several 
disadvantages. These are as follows.  
1. The fixed amount of taxes does not depend on actual outcomes of 
individual entrepreneurs’ performance. As a result, there may be 
disincentives to earn income in the sense that the presumptive income 
taxation is an entry barrier.  It may deterred people from starting a business 
when they think that the tax is so high that they had little chance to make 
a profit at all. For the same reason it may have forced people out of 
business who make too little profit.  
 
2. The presumption based on the standard assessment method treated 
equally all individual entrepreneurs within a given category, regardless of 
their actual income. As a result, it can be regressive by imposing equal tax 
on individual entrepreneurs in the same category with different income. 
This leads to violation of the principle of tax equity.  
These were addressed in 2002-2003. The Tax System Reform project of 2002 
aimed at creating a tax system which was more supportive of private sector 
development, improving revenue collection, and ensuring equity and fairness of the 
tax system. The tax reforms that have been initiated will lay the foundations for a 
strengthened revenue base. Continuing efforts to improve tax administration and 
collection, including strengthening the large taxpayer unit which accounts for about 
75 percent of several tax revenues, have resulted in tax revenues increasing from 
15.3 percent of GDP in 2001/02 to an estimated 16 percent in 2002/03.  
 Reforms have sought to streamline and close loopholes in the income tax, make 
the incentive system more efficient, strengthen the collection of domestic indirect 
taxes through selective rate increases and broaden the tax base while relying less 
on border taxation.  The tax reform greatly benefited from the IMF technical 
assistance specific measures that have been undertaken so far include:  
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Case study The Addis Ababa City Administration  Formulation of Tax policy and 
Legislation  
b)  Introduction of Presumptive Taxation System  
Total Number of Tax Payers 2009
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Tax Administration. Third Parties Involved Presumptive Taxation payments, Addis 
Ababa 
Institution  
Number of Outlets 
(Branches)  
Awash International 13  
Abysinia Bank 6  
Dasshen Bank 11  
Construction Business Bank 4  
Wogagen Bank 10  
Hebret Bank 5  
National Bank of Ethiopia 14  
Ethiopia Post Office 16  
Small Micro and Savings Enterprise 18  
Commercial Nominis 15  
Comercial Bank of Ethiopia 27  
Total Third Parties 139  
   
 
 
 
 
c)   Introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT)  
d)  Taxpayer Identification Number System (TIN)  
e)  FIRA Organization  
f)  Operational Programs, Systems and Procedures  
g) Continued measures to liberalize the tax regime 
 
Tax policy and Legislation  
 The overhaul of the tax legislations was designed to encourage capital investment 
and development, establish a sustainable domestic revenue base and ensure 
equity, fairness and consistency in the administration of the tax laws.  In order to 
ensure that the contributions of the various stakeholders were considered, an 
extensive consultation process on the comprehensive tax reform measures was 
carried out starting early 2002.  
  
1. The new Income tax Proclamation was introduced in July 2002 and provides 
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for reductions in the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 30%, the 
business income tax rate applicable to sole proprietors and partnerships 
from 40% to 35%, loss carry-forward provisions and new business income 
tax expenditure deductions.  
 
2. The VAT, at the rate of 15%, was introduced on January, 1, 2003 to replace 
the sales tax.  
 
3. A Turnover Tax, similar in scope to the VAT levied at the rate of 2% on 
goods and 10% on services and applicable to taxpayers whose annual 
turnover is below the VAT threshold was introduced on January 1, 2003.  
 
4. The Excise Tax Proclamation, which has been rationalized to more 
accurately reflect the current business environment, was introduced on 
January 1, 2003. The measures include the reduction of the excise tax 
through the exclusion of depreciation from the computation of the cost 
production upon which the tax is based.  
 
5. The enforcement powers of the tax authorities were strengthened, in 
accordance with international practices, which will improve taxpayer 
compliance.  
  
b)   Presumptive Taxation  
  
Presumptive taxation provides the instrument to broaden the tax base and raise 
more revenues from the hard-to-tax group, including the large informal sector and 
taxpayers who understate income.  The following measures have been introduced:  
    
The standard assessment method, applicable to the City and Regional taxpayers 
whose annual turnover is less than Birr 100,000, to replace the estimated 
assessment method which was subject to inconsistent application;   an advance 
business profits income tax on commercial imports at the rate of 3% based on C.I.F 
(cost, insurance and freight).   A withholding tax of 2% on payments made by 
private limited companies, public enterprises, government agencies, non-profit 
organizations and private non-profit institutions to designated categories of 
taxpayers. 
 
It should be noted that the disadvantages that existed before the reform and after 
the reforms are an inherent feature of presumption in general. It is impossible to 
remove all of them. In a certain degree, they can just be alleviated. At the same 
time, there are some additional disadvantages that are specific for the Ethiopian 
system of presumptive income taxation including following:  
 
1. There is an unjustified limitation on the number of physical persons that 
individual entrepreneurs can employ. This limitation means that individual 
entrepreneurs who employ more than 10 physical persons are obliged to 
register as a legal entity and hence use the regular system of taxation. 
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However, the choice of legal status of business should be made by 
individual entrepreneurs themselves and shouldn’t be determined by 
legislation. Otherwise, this limitation would lead to business split-up. 
  
In light of the growing popularity of presumptive taxation in developing nations, it 
is relevant to note the existing concerns that compromise its effectiveness. 
Governments that recognize the limitations of presumptive taxation include 
provisions in their tax codes that allow taxpayers opportunity for redress. Certain 
areas of concern are important to government wanting to implement presumptive 
taxation. The World Bank has highlighted some of these areas. (See Box Below) 
 
Box 2. Areas of Concern Presumptive taxation 
Systemic Corruption (WB) 
 
It is sometimes argued that presumptive taxation can help reduce corruption in the tax 
administration. However, the success of presumptive taxation in reducing corruption will 
depend both on the structure of the scheme and the overall administrative environment 
and capacity in the tax administration. A presumptive taxation scheme can in fact increase 
the discretionary power of tax officials and in a worst case scenario increase corrupt 
practices. A carefully designed presumptive taxation scheme can help reduce corruption, but 
can never be a substitute for much needed capacity building and administrative reforms 
within the tax administration. 
Crude Implementation 
 
Despite its streamlined requirements, presumptive taxation is not always effective because 
governments do not have sound tax administration systems in place at the federal, state or 
local levels to implement schemes as envisioned by policymakers. Countries in early stages 
of economic development tend to employ crude methods of estimating income because 
they lack sufficiently qualified resources to analyze the profitability of various economic 
activities and to define the indexes for effectively calculating presumptive incomes. As a 
result, small businesses in particular are routinely taxed unfairly and inefficiently. 
Undermines Tax base 
 
The primary goal of most governments that introduce presumptive taxation schemes is to 
broaden the country's tax base by preparing citizens and businesses in the informal sector 
to enter the formal tax net. However, presumptive taxation has proven to undermine this 
goal as taxpayers remain in presumptive taxation regimes indefinitely or regress from 
formal taxation programs to presumptive taxation schemes. This phenomenon tends to 
occur when sophisticated taxpayers earn above average income and recognize that standard 
assessments levy a lower tax burden. The result is that they either underreport income or 
simply pretend not to keep accurate records of income, as is prevalent in Israel, in order to 
remain in the presumptive regime and enjoy its benefits. 
Source World Bank: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/tax/presumptivedirecttaxes.html. 
 
 
Policymakers, therefore, are required to prioritize and decide what the main goal of 
the tax system for the HTT sector should be. Design instruments obviously vary in 
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accordance with the objective pursued.  Bird17 (2004)   has developed a matrix of 
approaches to tax hard-to-tax taxpayers: 
 
Dealing with Hard to Tax - HTT Sector 
Objectives Instruments Issues 
Bringing start-up 
firms into the tax 
net, enhancing 
taxpayer education 
Some form of 
simplified 
presumptive regime 
Critical to keep “presumed” level 
of tax liability high enough to 
encourage movement out; also 
to periodically evaluate all those 
in the system to ensure true 
eligibility. 
Getting revenues 
from those able to 
pay 
Alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) approach 
AMTs are often very 
complicated and cumbersome 
for both tax administrators and 
taxpayers. 
Increased equity in 
treatment of the 
HTT 
Enforce the law Politics is especially critical to 
the success of the tax 
administration in these cases of 
getting at the HTT.   
Lucrative businesses may be run 
by influential members of 
society who can affect the 
success of the tax 
administration. 
Getting some 
revenue from the 
underground 
economy 
Taxation via in direct 
taxes 
May challenge the equity of the 
tax system and further 
encourage tax evasion. 
Getting the HTT at 
low cost in the short 
term 
Legitimize the HTT via 
tax exemptions and tax 
holidays 
Although this instrument may 
reduce administrative  costs for 
very difficult cases (off-shore 
activities) or   very low yield 
activities (agriculture), it sets   
a dangerous precedent which 
encourages   non-compliance. 
   
Source: Bird, (2004) 
 
                                                
17 Is it Really so Hard to Tax the hard-to-Tax, in Alm/Martinez-Vazquez/Wallace, Taxing the 
Hard-to-Tax, 2004 
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The Road to Formalization (legal requirements for operating a business) 
What, if anything, can or should policymakers do to encourage enterprise 
formalization? These are important questions. Some estimates suggest that over 
30 percent of output and 70 percent of workers in developing countries are to 
some degree outside the scope of government regulation. In Africa the figures are 
even higher. There is much less agreement over what to do about informality. It is 
not necessarily harmful, either to individuals or to societies. Even relatively 
developed countries sustain quite large grey or shadow economies. 
In Ethiopia, an informal business operator presently has three ways to formalise: 
becoming a legal business, becoming a co-operative and/or obtaining a formal 
premise. None of these are ideal. The first has high costs, but still leaves him/her 
without access to credit, business development services and government orders. 
It does not solve the main constraints that business operators mention: the 
market is saturated: shortage of capital (28%), limited market/ market 
saturation (24%) and no working premise (10%) (CSA, 2003; World Bank, ii 
2007b). The second creates dependencies on the government and the third is 
compounded by weak land markets and high rents. In such a restrictive 
environment it is understandable that informality prospers. (See Annex 2: 
Procedures and costs associated with setting up a business in Ethiopia and Annex 
3; Evaluating the Business License) 
The bottom line is that policy makers need to understand exactly what informal 
sector entrepreneurs stand to gain from formalization. The benefits of 
formalization are and should be specific to each sector. 
Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the ongoing debate over the appropriate mechanisms for 
taxing the informal sector in developing countries with a focus on the use of 
presumptive taxation in the Ethiopian context.  
Presumptive taxation provides taxpayers with a simplified option for tax 
compliance without requiring full financial transparency. While presumptive 
taxation can be considered as an optimal method of curbing widespread non-
compliance without employing excessive government resources because it 
addresses the concerns of taxpayer and tax authority, caution in the 
implementation such a tax regime is required. The right balance between fairness 
and simplicity is required.  
It should be noted that an ideal taxation scheme can be monitored with minimal 
effort, is easily measurable, and reduces reporting and bookkeeping requirements. 
The most drastic reform of the taxation is the introduction of a single presumptive 
tax. Such systems are usually based on turnover or on specific indicators (i.e. floor 
space, number of employees, electricity consumption). Presumptive regimes trade 
fairness for simplicity. Indicators are usually very crude proxies for business 
profitability and turnover based systems are burdensome for firms with low profit 
margins and generous for those with high margins. (Engelschalk, 2007)  
Accordingly, constructing appropriate indicators or setting an appropriate tax rate 
for turnover based presumptive systems is challenging, requires extensive analysis 
of profit margins, and will usually be disputed by parts of the business community.   
Some countries make little use of presumptive methods of taxation, given that 
such methods inherently involve unfairness, because they involve a departure from 
the normal accounting methods used to determine the tax base. Taxpayers who 
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genuinely have no income might end up having to pay tax under a presumptive 
method that is not rebuttable.  
 On the other hand, if compliance with and administration of the income tax is so  
uneven that the normal rules do not lead to equal treatment of taxpayers with 
equal  income, then presumptive methods may prove attractive. Of fundamental 
importance is the capacity of the tax administration to handle the particular 
presumptive method.  
Attention must also be paid to how a particular presumptive method will work in 
practice. If taxpayers can hide the factors on which the presumption is based as 
easily as they can hide income, then the presumption will not be of much use. This 
is an empirical question, which also depends on the administrative capacity of the 
tax authorities, and the appropriate methods will therefore differ from country to 
country.   
 Another element to take into account in evaluating whether and how presumptive 
approaches should be used is that presumptions can involve the granting of a tax 
preference. Depending on how a presumption is determined and applied, it can 
result in a reduced burden for particular kinds of taxpayers. This is particularly the 
case where the presumption is elective, as in the case of the French contractual 
method. Thus, the purpose of the presumption can become the protection of a 
certain group of taxpayers (e.g., small business or farmers) rather than protection 
of revenue. In cases where the presumption is preferential, its application is often 
limited. For example, it may be available only for taxpayers with a turnover below a 
certain amount. In some cases, the availability of the presumptive method may 
depend on the legal form of business organization. For example, if all legal persons 
are required to keep books under the commercial code, then the use of 
presumptions may be restricted to physical persons.  
While this approach has some justification, it has the disadvantage of discouraging 
incorporation in situations where the presumptive method is advantageous to the 
taxpayer.   
It should be also mentioned that the chosen system of presumptive taxes meant 
designed to solve a narrow scope of problems is likely to be useless for the solution 
of other tasks. Therefore, the starting point in developing the system of 
presumptive taxation should be to identify and designate purposes and priorities to 
be taken into account in the framework of the tax legislation.   
The international experience shows that the efficiency of application of 
presumptive taxation depends to a great extent on the state of the database, 
regulation of the accounting and calculation procedures and the quality of tax 
administration.   
(Makedonskiy, 2005)  
In the Ethiopian the use of presumptive taxation is far advanced than in most 
other African countries. However work still has to be done to improve certain key 
areas in the system. These include: 
 The continued Identification and registration of small taxpayers  
 Encouraging voluntary compliance  
 Simple and effective determination of tax liability 
 Keeping the complexity and compliance costs low for small business  
 Keeping the cost of tax administration as a percentage of revenue 
collections low.  
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It is also interesting to note that in spite of being quite widespread in developing 
countries, presumptive taxation has received very little attention in the public 
finance literature. With few exceptions, the available analyses are based on 
collections of case studies and focus mainly on the administrative rationale for 
such taxes, but they lack an explicit formal model of the tax structure or the 
taxpayer’s problem. These could be key areas for further research.
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m
m
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 p
ro
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 b
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Le
ga
l F
or
m
: P
riv
at
e 
Li
m
it
ed
 C
om
pa
ny
 (P
LC
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 M
in
im
um
 C
ap
it
al
 R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t:
   
 
Ci
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dd
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ba
ba
 
 N
o 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
Ti
m
e 
to
 c
om
pl
et
e 
Co
st
 t
o 
Co
m
pl
et
e 
Co
m
m
en
t 
 
1 
Ch
ec
k 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 n
am
e 
fo
r u
ni
qu
en
es
s 
 
1 
da
y 
no
 c
ha
rg
e 
Ev
id
en
ce
  o
f 
 c
ap
it
al
  d
ep
os
it
  i
s 
 n
ot
  r
eq
ui
re
d 
 f
or
  p
ri
va
te
  
lim
it
ed
  c
om
pa
ni
es
.  
H
ow
ev
er
,  
th
e 
 
m
em
or
an
du
m
  o
f 
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
  s
ho
ul
d 
 s
ho
w
  t
ha
t 
 “
th
e 
 c
ap
it
al
  
is
  f
ul
ly
  p
ai
d”
  i
n 
 c
as
h 
 o
r  
in
  k
in
d.
  
In
  p
ra
ct
ic
e,
  a
s 
 lo
ng
  a
s 
 t
he
  m
em
or
an
du
m
  o
f 
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
  
in
di
ca
te
s 
 t
ha
t 
 “
th
e 
 c
ap
it
al
  i
s 
 f
ul
ly
  p
ai
d,
” 
de
m
on
st
ra
ti
on
 o
f 
ac
tu
al
 p
ay
m
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 re
qu
ire
d.
 
2 
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t 
au
th
en
ti
ca
te
s 
th
e 
m
em
or
an
du
m
 a
nd
 a
rt
ic
le
s 
of
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 a
t 
th
e 
O
ff
ic
e 
fo
r A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
of
 D
oc
um
en
ts
 a
t 
th
e 
Ju
st
ic
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
an
d 
pa
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 f
ee
s.
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da
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no
 c
ha
rg
e 
Th
e 
 O
ff
ic
e 
 f
or
  A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
 a
nd
  R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
 o
f 
 
D
oc
um
en
ts
  s
er
ve
s 
 m
ai
nl
y 
 t
o 
 p
ro
vi
de
  n
ot
ar
y 
 p
ub
lic
  s
er
vi
ce
s.
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 a
pp
lic
an
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  a
pp
ea
r  
in
  p
er
so
n 
 a
t 
 t
he
  a
pp
oi
nt
ed
  d
at
e,
  
w
it
h 
 a
n 
 o
rig
in
al
  c
op
y 
 o
f 
 t
he
ir 
 le
tt
er
  o
f 
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
t 
 (p
ow
er
  
of
  a
tt
or
ne
y)
  a
nd
  a
  v
al
id
  i
de
nt
it
y 
 c
ar
d.
  
V
ar
io
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  o
ff
ic
er
s 
 c
he
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  v
al
id
it
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 o
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 t
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  d
oc
um
en
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,  
th
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au
th
en
ti
ci
ty
  o
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 t
he
  s
ig
na
tu
re
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he
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en
ui
ne
ne
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  o
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 t
he
  
id
en
ti
ty
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ar
ds
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nd
 a
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ic
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of
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on
 
ar
e 
re
ad
ie
d 
fo
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 d
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is
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m
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or
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du
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ci
at
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om
m
er
ci
al
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eg
is
te
r a
t 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 T
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de
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nd
 In
du
st
ry
 
3 
da
ys
  
ET
B
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5 
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e 
fe
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 d
ep
en
d 
on
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
’s
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eg
is
te
re
d 
ca
pi
ta
l. 
 I
f 
 t
he
  
co
m
pa
ny
  
ha
s 
 a
  
re
gi
st
er
ed
 c
ap
it
al
  
of
  
ET
B
  
15
,0
0
0
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 t
he
  
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
  
fe
e 
 i
s 
 E
TB
  
15
, 
 t
he
  
lic
en
si
ng
  
fe
e 
 i
s 
 E
TB
  
35
,  
fo
rm
s 
an
d 
 c
ar
ds
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st
  
ET
B
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an
d 
 s
ta
m
ps
  
co
st
  
B
irr
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th
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 c
om
pa
ny
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gi
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ed
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pi
ta
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0
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0
0
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gi
st
ra
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 E
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0
0
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ce
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in
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 f
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 E
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0
0
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an
d 
 t
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s 
 o
f 
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d 
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d 
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 r
em
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n 
ET
B
 1
2 
an
d 
ET
B
 1
0
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pe
ct
iv
el
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io
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 f
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eg
is
tr
at
io
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 t
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ie
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 c
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pl
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re
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en
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 c
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 c
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si
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m
en
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om
e 
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  t
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 o
th
er
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ep
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en
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an
d 
 i
nt
er
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l 
 t
im
e 
 l
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ra
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ad
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R
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r w
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w
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 t
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 f
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 c
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 f
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 f
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m
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 t
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pa
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e 
 a
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he
  e
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  o
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om
pa
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  f
is
ca
l  
ye
ar
,  
an
d 
 p
ay
  
m
un
ic
ip
al
  
an
d 
 li
ce
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e 
 r
en
ew
al
  
fe
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an
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 w
it
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ol
di
ng
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s 
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 t
he
ir 
em
pl
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ee
s.
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m
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da
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bu
t 
is
 re
qu
ire
d 
in
 p
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at
in
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R
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it
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V
al
ua
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on
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R
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e 
Fe
e 
R
at
e 
St
ru
ct
ur
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R
ev
en
ue
 P
ot
en
ti
al
 
A
 b
us
in
es
s 
lic
en
se
 t
ax
 l
ev
ie
d 
on
 a
ll 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 
te
nd
s 
to
 g
en
er
at
e 
m
or
e 
re
ve
nu
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 o
n 
a 
se
le
ct
iv
e 
ba
se
. 
 A
 b
ro
ad
er
 b
as
e 
w
ill
 t
en
d 
to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
or
e 
st
ab
ili
ty
 t
ha
n 
a 
na
rr
ow
 b
as
e.
 
Bu
oy
an
cy
 
de
pe
nd
s 
on
 
w
hi
ch
 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 
ar
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 t
ax
ed
, 
ho
w
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
va
lu
ed
 a
nd
 t
he
 
re
ve
nu
e 
ba
se
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
. 
W
ei
gh
ti
ng
 t
he
 t
ax
 b
as
e 
by
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
it
y 
su
ch
 a
s 
gr
os
s 
re
ce
ip
ts
 o
r p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y 
w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 t
he
 t
ax
 b
as
e 
an
d 
po
te
nt
ia
lly
 it
s 
re
ve
nu
e 
ge
ne
ra
ti
on
. 
W
it
h 
a 
fl
at
 r
at
e,
 t
he
 y
ie
ld
 w
ill
 b
e 
se
ve
re
ly
 li
m
it
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 t
o 
pa
y 
of
 t
he
 s
m
al
le
st
/ 
po
or
es
t 
ta
xp
ay
er
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 f
ee
s 
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de
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 in
fl
at
io
n 
an
d 
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nc
e 
pe
rio
di
c 
ad
ju
st
m
en
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e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
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n 
co
nt
ra
st
, a
dv
al
or
em
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 t
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d 
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pr
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le
m
 o
f 
er
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io
n 
by
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fl
at
io
n.
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ti
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 t
en
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 t
o 
be
 m
or
e 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 
le
vi
ed
 o
nl
y 
on
 a
 f
ew
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
  I
f 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
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se
 is
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ee
n 
as
 a
 l
ev
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
iv
ile
ge
 o
f 
en
ga
gi
ng
 i
n 
an
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
, a
ll 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 m
us
t 
be
 t
ax
ed
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 t
he
 h
or
iz
on
ta
l e
qu
it
y 
pr
in
ci
pl
e.
 
 E
qu
it
y 
is
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
dr
am
at
ic
al
ly
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
de
fi
ni
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ta
x 
ba
se
” 
w
ei
gh
t.
” 
 In
 
ge
ne
ra
l, 
ba
se
d 
on
 t
he
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 p
ay
 p
rin
ci
pl
e,
 t
he
 
ta
x 
ba
se
 w
ei
gh
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
re
fl
ec
ti
on
 o
f 
pr
of
it
ab
ili
ty
 o
r a
bi
lit
y 
to
 p
ay
. B
us
in
es
se
s 
th
at
 
ge
ne
ra
 m
or
e 
sa
le
s/
in
co
m
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
 a
 
po
si
ti
on
 b
et
te
r a
bl
e 
to
 p
ay
 t
he
 t
ax
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
w
ei
gh
t 
us
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ta
x 
ba
se
 c
an
 a
ls
o 
cr
ea
te
 
eq
ui
ty
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
si
nc
e 
a 
pe
r u
ni
t 
fl
at
 u
ni
t 
ta
x 
di
sc
rim
in
at
es
 a
ga
in
st
 s
m
al
l f
irm
s 
or
 t
ho
se
 w
it
h 
lo
w
 p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y;
 a
 t
ax
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
gr
os
s 
re
ce
ip
ts
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
es
 a
ga
in
st
 b
us
in
es
se
s 
th
at
 
ha
ve
 a
 lo
w
 ra
ti
o 
of
 n
et
 p
ro
fi
ts
 t
o 
sa
le
s;
 a
 t
ax
 
ba
se
d 
on
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
va
lu
e 
or
 t
he
 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
m
ay
 a
ls
o 
be
ar
 n
o 
re
la
ti
on
 
to
 p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y,
 w
hi
le
 a
 t
ax
 
ba
se
d 
on
 t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
ill
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
la
bo
r-
in
te
ns
iv
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
. 
In
 g
en
er
al
, f
la
t 
fe
es
 c
an
 b
e 
ve
ry
 
in
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
si
nc
e 
th
ey
 b
ea
r n
o 
re
la
ti
on
 
to
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
r p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y.
  A
 ra
te
 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
gr
ad
ua
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 b
us
in
es
s 
ca
te
go
ry
 o
r s
iz
e 
ca
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 v
er
ti
ca
l e
qu
it
y.
  H
ow
ev
er
, 
bu
si
ne
ss
 li
ce
ns
es
 o
r t
ax
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t 
be
 
us
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
eq
ua
liz
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
. C
on
ce
pt
s 
of
 e
qu
it
y 
sh
ou
ld
 
be
 f
oc
us
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
en
ti
re
 p
ub
lic
 f
in
an
ce
 
sy
st
em
, n
ot
 o
n 
a 
sp
ec
if
ic
 t
ax
 in
 
is
ol
at
io
n.
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 Revenue Base Definition 
 
Valuation of Revenue Base Fee Rate Structure 
Efficiency If a tax is imposed only on 
certain activities and the tax 
is high, it can be 
economically distorting, 
discouraging businesses in 
the taxed sectors and 
encouraging evasion. 
 Business taxes based on 
gross receipts, property value 
or number of employees can 
create problems of overlap 
with sales taxes or VAT , 
property taxes and payroll 
taxes.  This will affect the 
final equity of the tax 
system. 
Efficiency is always affected 
by taxation—the extent of 
the inefficiency depends on 
the rate structure and the 
demand and supply 
elasticities within the 
particular market.  In general, 
a lump sum flat tax would be 
the most efficient since it 
would not tend to discourage 
the production decision at 
the margin.  On the other 
hand, a tax on gross receipts 
may discourage sales at the 
margin. 
See comments under 
“Valuation of Tax Base” 
Administration Broad coverage, particularly 
where 
this includes small 
businesses and the informal 
sector, is likely to increase 
the costs of administration. 
However, exemptions can 
also increase the cost of 
administration. 
 
A lump sum flat tax is the 
easiest to measure and 
administer.  The difficulties 
of estimating the gross 
income and gross receipts 
increase the administrative 
complexities. With many 
businesses in the informal 
sector, obtaining accurate 
information on turnover or 
profitability is practically 
impossible. 
Flat fee structures are 
simple, implying low cost 
administration and 
compliance.  This is 
importantwhen the taxing 
government has limited 
administrative and 
technical capacity. 
Graduated tariff 
structures do increase 
complexity but can 
increase revenues; thus 
the cost to revenue ratio 
may not increase. 
Political 
acceptability 
A narrow definition of tax 
base will reduce the scale of 
opposition but may 
encourage the intensity of 
those objections. A broader 
base will spread out the tax 
burden, potentially 
minimizing the intensity of 
the opposition. Perceived 
fairness by taxpayers will 
affect the 
political acceptability of the 
tax base definitions 
Depends largely on the 
perceived fairness of the 
system and the extent to 
which the tax can be 
disguised in the price to the 
final consumer. 
See comments under 
“Valuation of Tax Base” 
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2009 Ethiopia 
  
